The new sanctions list of the European Union includes 189 tankers of Russia’s “shadow fleet,” as well as 75 individuals and legal entities, among them 35 companies from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Serbia, Turkey, and the UAE, which help supply Russian military factories with components needed for weapons production. The Russian companies listed include:
▪️Surgutneftegas;
▪️the machine tool holding “Stan,” part of the Rostec structure;
▪️the insurance company VSK;
▪️the gold mining company Atlas Mining;
▪️the drone developer “Unmanned Systems”;
▪️the Khersones Tavrichesky museum-reserve;
▪️the weapons manufacturer Lobaev Arms.
Following the EU, the United Kingdom also published its sanctions list.
New UK sanctions target the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) and the Saint Petersburg currency exchange, the company A7 (created with the participation of PSB Bank and specializing in foreign economic transactions), as well as the electronics components distributor MT-Systems and the non-commercial organization “Petersburg Settlement Center.” Restrictions also affected several depositories and registrars, including Surgutinvestneft, VTB Registrar, VTB Specialized Depository, R.O.S.T., etc. The UK also added 18 tankers to the sanctions list. The list includes 20 individuals, among them a British citizen and 14 members of the Social Design Agency (SDA), which is accused of waging an information war against Ukraine’s sovereignty and democracy.
It is clear that the most serious restriction in both lists concerns tankers transporting Russian oil sold above the set price cap of $60 per barrel. Equally obvious is that at present, this list has no real impact, since Russian oil currently sells for less than the infamous $60.
However, it cannot be said that the sanctions pressure on Russia has run out of steam. On the contrary, it is gaining a second wind.
Take Hungary with its traditional veto—as Financial Times found out, the EU has found a way out. Since adopting and extending sanctions requires unanimous approval from all 27 EU countries, the European Commission is now developing new legal frameworks that will allow sanctions to be imposed by a simple majority, and some measures concerning individual countries (for example, frozen Russian assets in the Belgian depository Euroclear) can be handled at the national legislation level.
As for Trump, after his Monday conversation with Putin, for which the EU apparently delayed publishing the 17th sanctions package, it became clear that no imminent ceasefire, let alone peace, is in sight. Trump himself quite openly stated his unwillingness to continue playing the role of mediator—despite his energetic tweet, the mission’s failure became obvious even to him—and now the only intrigue is whether Ukraine and Europe will be left without American military aid or if it will continue, albeit for payment. Accordingly, the EU no longer needs to worry about upsetting Trump and, moreover, can use sanctions pressure to compensate for reduced military pressure due to the US stepping back.
Returning to the topic of tankers—the EU is already discussing lowering the oil price cap to $50 per barrel. This very discussion may be a way to pressure Russia. Yes, as Bloomberg writes,
Russia has learned to transport oil through secret routes. But, firstly, this means increased costs. Secondly, it limits buyers to those less concerned about the legality of supplies.
Yes, among such countries are China and India, the largest importers of Russian oil. But China is already reducing its purchase of Russian oil, preferring to buy oil from Malaysia. Of course, it’s no secret that Malaysia sells more oil than it produces, acting as an intermediary for Iranian and Russian oil sales, while “chipping away” at the revenues of Russian exporters.
Finally, EU leaders seem to have realized that Europe’s salvation is Europe’s own responsibility, and have finally agreed on a defense fund of 150 billion euros.
Although, as Bloomberg writes, without the US these measures are much less effective. Primarily because sanctions without the threat of secondary sanctions for circumvention are far less dangerous. And secondary sanctions are impossible without the US, since the US dollar is the world’s reserve currency, and only banning transactions in it can force violators to stop.
Under these circumstances, it is logical to assume that the EU will now move to more decisive—and possibly more brazen in terms of international law—measures against Russia. In any case, the head of the EU’s foreign service, Kaja Kallas, in her post expressed Europe’s determination to increase pressure on Russia. How effective this pressure will be remains to be seen. But it is clear that Europeans are unlikely to continue considering the opinions of the US or at least Trump. So we await the next, 18th sanctions package. It may bring surprises.
