What to do when Revolut closes accounts of Russian emigrants and Germany does not issue humanitarian visas

In just one day [after the mass account closures], many who sent us messages about the blocks wrote that their accounts were unblocked, some even with apologies. People also shared information with us about how to and how not to upload documents so that Revolut would accept them. Clearly, this is a case of obvious overcompliance and a very broad interpretation of sanctions restrictions.

Overall, I see two problems. The first is on the part of the European Union, which formulates fairly general restrictions that can affect a large number of legal EU residents. Those whose documents are being renewed, at the application stage, those who have D visas – none of this is detailed.

The second problem is the behavior of the bank as a commercial organization towards its clients. And this is already a reputational issue. For example, the bank’s security or legal department may interpret the legislation this way. But, firstly, the bank can also contact the European Commission if it has doubts about the interpretation of sanctions restrictions and request clarifications on whether they understood it correctly. Secondly, it is strange to send a client a letter demanding a document and at the same time a letter about account blocking. Moreover, it is strange not to anticipate that there will be inquiries to customer support (and the support simply crashed after that).

In my opinion, this is not very good behavior by the bank towards its clients. And clients should think carefully about whether to deal with such a bank. Fortunately, there are alternatives – Wise, for example, and other neobanks are more loyal to clients.

We also received another report about the closure of an account of a resident of Germany at the German Commerzbank [after our conversation with Anastasia Burakova, the editor-in-chief of Most, Olga Proskurnina, received a notice about the closure of her personal account at the French bank AXA — Most.Media]. Other banks in EU countries did not take such actions. But now it is important for us to get clarification on the application of sanctions restrictions from the European Commission. And not only for us.

We also asked the European Commission to send clarifications to the central banks of EU countries so that they communicate to banks in their jurisdictions how these restrictions should be interpreted and so that in the future Russians do not face such cases of overcompliance.

What Kovcheg has already achieved from European authorities in the interests of Russians

We have been working for three and a half years now, and if we, together with other human rights organizations, had not communicated with European authorities, there would be no humanitarian visas for Russians. [Before the start of the mass anti-war emigration from Russia] humanitarian visa programs existed in some EU countries but did not extend to Russians. This is thanks to Russian human rights organizations, which compiled cases of human rights violations and explained to decision-makers in Europe how repressive legislation is applied in Russia.

Or, for example, a notable case: in Germany at the end of 2022, the consular link for obtaining migration visas to residence permits or citizenship was abolished. This was because many Russians were leaving Russia [through transit countries], publicly opposing the war and could no longer return home. But further applications for migration visas, even if they found a job offer or enrolled in a university in the EU, could only be submitted either in the country where they had residence permits or in their country of citizenship. And this was often unrealistic: for example, many people settled in Georgia, Armenia, where the process of obtaining local residence permits often ended unsuccessfully without any objective reasons. We lobbied for migration visas to be issued without tying them to the country of citizenship or residence permit, justifying the situation by citing examples of refusals. Ultimately, Germany changed this procedure for migration visas at the systemic level.

Sometimes people say: oh, you just go to conferences or write reports that no one needs. But without this, sorry, Europeans would not know about the problem. They would have nothing to rely on when making decisions about extending humanitarian programs to Russians or even on individual asylum cases. This methodical work, which is not very visible and takes a huge amount of time, is actually an important support to justify risks and explain what is happening in Russia.

When we all lived in Russia, average officials or politicians had no idea how human rights were violated in Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. In fact, European politicians care about other countries about as much. Because their priority is the problems of their own populations, their voters. And to convey what is happening with us and why we need help, you have to work very hard on this and back it up with verified evidence.

Unfortunately, now in Germany almost no Russians qualify for humanitarian visas, although the program formally exists. We do not live in a vacuum, and the world does not revolve around Russians.

Europe has its own internal problems, including the rise of right-wing parties, so European politics is changing. In fact, the Kremlin also contributes significantly here through large disinformation networks in local languages, on which it spends huge resources, and even through financing parties like the AfD. That is why the German coalition government is trying to prevent the AfD from coming to power in the next electoral cycle and is tightening migration legislation in many areas.

There are even more grounds for legal migration of qualified specialists. For example, after the war in Ukraine began, Germany introduced one-year residence permits to look for work: even if a person does not have a job offer but can confirm their qualifications and demand on the German labor market, they can come and look for work in Germany for a year. But regarding humanitarian reception programs or refugee intake, we will see these inevitable changes in all countries.

I would say the situation now is close to the migration crisis of 2015, when there was an active phase of the civil war in Syria and European countries closed borders within the Schengen zone, set up patrols, and so on. Now the number of asylum seekers and illegal migrants is not the same, but close.

In Europe, there is a public demand for restriction of illegal migration or humanitarian reception, and European politicians act based on the demands of their voters.

We cannot ignore the objective situation in countries. We can only offer some mutually acceptable ways to help. I argue this also by the fact that Russians usually come with education, learn the language, integrate – that is, they quickly become full members of society who pay taxes, are useful to the country, and so on. It’s a two-way street.

What Russian anti-war emigration looks like in 2025

Currently, of course, there is no mass wave of emigration from Russia like after the war or mobilization began. But we still have emergency aid formats because, unfortunately, repression continues in Russia. New groups of people who try to express their opinions, for statements or even songs, unfortunately become targets for persecution. Legislation regarding conscription is also tightening, and people fear getting caught in this meat grinder. So I cannot say that our emergency work stopped in 2022 or 2023. Unfortunately, there are still quite a lot of requests.

We work with other organizations involved in evacuations from Russia – with “Go Forest,” “I’m Getting Out,” and so on. We pick up people in visa-free third countries and help them on site. Honestly, I don’t expect a wave of mass emigration. But we are always ready for it.

When mobilization started, in Kazakhstan we literally opened shelters in three cities in three days, despite the fact that it was almost impossible to find rental housing. So we can deploy infrastructure if needed, God forbid. Kovcheg has a large volunteer network – over 3,500 people, so it’s actually not that difficult.

It’s clear that Kovcheg has a specific audience – not only political activists but also business and specialists in various fields. And I think among those who left after mobilization began [in September 2022], only a small part belongs to our audience.

From my impressions, based on support requests and the legal aid bot, more people from the second wave after mobilization returned to Russia than from the first.

Often people who left had no international experience, often didn’t even have a foreign passport, had never traveled abroad or only for limited tourist purposes through tour packages. So it was harder for such people to settle abroad. When the sense of danger subsided and active mobilization measures slowed down a bit, people started returning. Without language knowledge or a profession that helps adapt in the international labor market, it is very difficult to settle. Savings run out, and in countries where Russians can enter without visas, the economic situation is not very good, and the labor market is not as large as in economically prosperous countries.

I think about 40% of the total number returned to Russia. We estimated the two waves of departure at about one and a half million people. Abroad, according to our estimates, about 800,000 to 900,000 remain. But these are our estimates, not objective data that can be used statistically.