Forecast: In three years, there will be no internet left in Russia

Classical censorship means forbidding. The Russian innovation is to turn off everything except what is allowed. The Ministry of Digital Development, together with operators launches a pilot “white list” — a list of platforms and applications that will remain accessible during mobile internet shutdowns. It includes government portals, payment systems (“Mir”), VK/“Yandex” services, marketplaces Ozon/WB, Avito, Rutube/“Kinopoisk,” major banks, and 2GIS; WhatsApp and YouTube are excluded. The technical justification is a “special solution” that allows local services to continue working during communication shutdowns. In practice, this means a controlled oxygen mask: commerce and payments survive, alternative information does not.

At the same time, a historic spike in the number of shutdowns has been recorded. According to the “On the Line” project, there were at least 2,099 mobile internet shutdowns across the country in July alone; 662 in June, and 69 in May. International human rights defenders confirm: Russia is breaking its own records for jamming communications. This is the new normal.

Stricter than in China

To cement the habit of living inside the perimeter, the authorities are promoting the VK “national messenger” MAX. It is being made mandatory for pre-installation on new devices, integrated with “Gosuslugi” and payments, and competitors are actively pushed out through technical restrictions on WhatsApp/Telegram calls and tariff “carrots” from operators. The key difference is the absence of transparent end-to-end encryption and direct data exchange with the state: what Telegram and WhatsApp promise to hide, MAX is designed to collect.

China’s “wall” is permanent filtering through government gateways and a mature internal ecosystem: WeChat, Baidu, Douyin, Alipay. The internet there is restricted but predictable: access is stable, and internal alternatives are powerful. The Russian model is “standard blackouts” plus a “white corridor” of own services and mandatory MAX.

For the user, this feels harsher: connectivity disappears in waves, external sources are cut off completely, and local analogues are weaker and more transparent for surveillance.

International reports note an acceleration of this trend: increasing VPN blocking complexity, a rise in cases of persecution for opposition publications, and a combination of censorship and manipulation.

Technology without overload: how it’s done

The enforcement toolkit is familiar, but now it’s combined into a “combine”:

- DPI on operator networks: protocol filtering, degradation of call/video quality in “foreign” messengers, prioritization of whitelisted domain groups.

- Centralized “buttons” at regional headquarters: rapid shutdown of mobile internet across hundreds of cells while preserving whitelisted traffic.

- Legal regime: mandatory pre-installation of MAX, “recommendations” to government bodies and schools to switch to MAX, alongside pressure on VPNs and legal delegitimization of circumvention.

The result is an internet that can be turned off “piece by piece” and turned on exactly as much as needed for controlled consumption.

As an IT specialist who, a few years ago, predicted the inevitable tightening of censorship in Runet, today I take the liberty to present a new forecast for your consideration.

Year one. The white list will no longer be a pilot but the default mode during any “threat” — from drills to elections. MAX will become the standard way to interact with the state and schools, and operators will suffocate calls and media on WhatsApp/Telegram both tariff-wise and technically. The crackdown on VPNs will intensify: deep packet inspection systems, testing of OpenVPN, WireGuard, IPSec, PPTP, L2TP blocking, DNS poisoning. The number of “planned” shutdowns will grow, and their geographic reach will expand.

Year two. The white list will no longer turn off with the signal — it will be fixed as a “safe access mode” even when the network is on: everything “non-white” will be slower, delayed, with frequent “technical maintenance.” MAX will turn into a “super app”: messenger, payments, government services, electronic voting, doctor appointments, delivery. Authorization through MAX will become mandatory for some services. Each user will effectively be assigned a permanent digital footprint with a behavioral profile, and targeted “glitches” will begin to coincide with police operations, electoral, and protest surges.

Year three. Full traffic control. All foreign services (Google Cloud, Amazon, and others) will be unavailable. VPN use will be de facto criminalized except under special permits (state VPN), DPI will reliably detect mass circumvention, and MAX will become the only legitimate channel for “fast” communication: alternatives will live in a “gray zone” with permanent degradation. The white list will be expanded to an illusion of choice, but critical external sources will remain behind the wall. An extended blacklist of devices/SIM cards based on “behavioral” criteria will be introduced, and automated moderation in MAX will take on the role of a “preliminary investigator” — from hidden shadow bans to forwarding cases “where they belong.”

This is no longer the internet but a monitored communication contour. And yes, you will no longer be able to read either “Most” or other media while in Russia, and we will not be able to effectively circumvent these blocks.

Why this will work specifically in Russia

Unlike China, Russia has not built a self-sufficient ecosystem over decades: it will be replaced by a “minimally viable set.” But the Russian state has three trump cards. The first is legal arbitrariness combined with technical unpredictability: to disconnect, “kill,” slow down — and explain it as “security.” The second is the consolidation of platforms and payment systems within a couple of holdings conveniently integrated into the white contour. The third is user fear and fatigue.

When bank cards and delivery work, most will accept that the news is “temporarily unavailable.”

International observers already record a sharp deterioration in internet freedom and growing isolation. The trend is not theoretical; it has arrived.

The “white list” is not sovereignty but a test light in a bunker. MAX is not a messenger but a digital checkpoint. Soon, connectivity in Russia will finally become a regulated service: turn it on — you see the storefront and the checkout; turn it off — you remain in darkness. China built solid walls; Russia is learning to turn off the sky. If the course does not change, in three years the word “internet” in Russia will mean not a network but a corridor. And in that corridor, the light by the door will always be on, where someone is already waiting for you.