From a shaken Kremlin to the walls of immobile China. Is the Moscow-Beijing rapprochement dangerous for Europe?

One of the West’s main strategic ideas for ensuring the stability of the global peace, dating back to Kissinger, was the notion of the danger posed by a close alliance between Russia and China. It was believed that together they could represent a formidable force capable of challenging Western dominance. One consequence of this view was a new policy towards Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, aimed at tying Moscow to Europe through numerous political, economic, and cultural ties. It was assumed that Russia, as part of Western civilization—albeit peripheral and highly particular—would sooner or later recognize the benefits of a democratic system, unlike China, which always follows its own path—and these two different choices by two different societies might prevent the emergence of a dangerous alliance.

Life altered this worldview at the beginning of the 21st century. On one hand, Russia, having accumulated oil wealth, entered into a prolonged confrontation with the West and chose to build an authoritarian regime rather than pursue democratic development. On the other hand, China became a superpower whose growing ambitions increasingly worried Washington, regardless of the president in the White House. Meanwhile, Western allies diverged in their views on the main threat: while the US saw its main rival undoubtedly in China, Europe, after the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, began to understand that the storm clouds were gathering much closer, on its eastern borders. Meanwhile, Moscow and Beijing did not skimp on friendly gestures towards each other, conducted joint military exercises, and signed numerous agreements to strengthen cooperation, publicly demonstrating mutual sympathy.

These circumstances contributed primarily to the emergence in Washington of a somewhat alarmist viewpoint, claiming that the rapprochement between Russia and China is proceeding at too rapid a pace, posing an exceptional danger to American strategic interests—therefore, all possible efforts must be made to hinder it. In particular, one might consider certain special concerns of Moscow, make concessions to it in the post-Soviet space, offer joint energy projects—and then the Russians might happily forget about the Chinese. Similar voices were heard in Europe, but to a lesser extent. Nevertheless, the talks that Western policy allegedly “pushed Russia into the arms of China“ never ceased, as did calls to revise this mistaken line before it is too late.

It is important to understand how these views relate to reality, primarily for Europe.

Is it possible and necessary to detach Russia from China?

China’s status in the modern world is such that virtually all countries cooperate with it, but Russia has several additional objective prerequisites for this. These include geographic proximity; the economic logic of exchanging Russian raw materials for Chinese goods, technologies, and investments; and finally, the natural closeness of two dictatorships, despite their differences, both striving to redraw spheres of influence and establish a new world order. It is hard to imagine what gifts would need to be offered to Putin or his successor to pursue a course of distancing from China; moreover, it is even less clear how this could be implemented and monitored in practice.

However, the concerns—primarily American—boil down essentially to the Taiwan issue and, more broadly, dominance in the Pacific Ocean. So far, Chinese expansion worldwide has been carried out by harsh but non-military means, but with regard to the defiant island, statements threatening armed intervention have been made. No one, however, knows what will happen in the near future. Will China really dare attempt a military operation in Taiwan despite the risks of direct confrontation with the US, without exhausting political and economic pressure first? And does Russia’s role in this hypothetical clash seem exaggerated? There is no point in delving into various scenarios whose likelihood no one can assess, but one observation can already be made.

None of the European countries is bound to Taiwan by a military assistance treaty; the conflict in the Pacific could potentially have a global character, affecting EU interests, but, to use Trump’s expression, in first approximation this will not be Europe’s war, just as the war in Ukraine is not recognized as such in Washington. Therefore, Europeans should not be overly concerned about how the Russia-China rapprochement might affect developments around Taiwan, especially since they have plenty of other concerns.

The war in Ukraine is far more important for Europe, and here China’s position is of great significance. What is it?

Politically, China has never supported Russian aggression anywhere; it has not recognized territorial acquisitions; moreover, all official statements have amounted to calls for ending the conflict based on UN principles, which means no changing of borders by force. Publicly, Chinese representatives have always called for moderation and de-escalation. However, Beijing has also refrained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: at key votes on this issue in the UN General Assembly, China abstained. But, on the other hand, who could have expected otherwise? Almost the entire non-Western world holds roughly the same position, disapproving of Moscow’s actions but not cutting economic ties with it.

There are, however, more serious accusations against Beijing, which is Russia’s largest oil buyer and is allegedly helping to violate the sanctions regime by supplying dual-use goods to Russia. But, first, Russian oil cannot be removed from the global market without a significant price increase (which no one wants), and if China does not buy it, someone else will. A sensible approach should be to increase Moscow’s costs and thus reduce its export revenues, but this is hardly Beijing’s business, which benefits from the current situation. Many in its place would act the same way.

Second, China, maintaining neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war, has always rejected accusations of supplying arms to Moscow. As for the sanctions regime, many are eager to profit by finding and creating loopholes in the sanctions barrier, especially since Russia is willing to pay. These enterprising individuals live in different countries, know how to create companies in various jurisdictions, and operate so that all formal rules are observed. Most likely, Beijing turns a blind eye to the export of certain dual-use products to Russia from its territory, but why should it show any special zeal to stop these flows? After all, it did not impose sanctions.

Thus, China’s neutrality today can be called partly friendly towards Russia, but it is still neutrality, and it is better than direct support, as in the case of North Korea. This position of China has been unchanged for three and a half years, and there is no reason to believe it will be revised.

Under these circumstances, talks about the danger of the Russia-China rapprochement seem pointless because, first, a certain level of rapprochement has already been reached and cannot be prevented, and second, Beijing’s current support for Moscow remains quite moderate and does not escalate into a new quality.

The Russian threat

French President Emmanuel Macron characterized Russia as “a cannibal at our gates,” which generally corresponds to the European worldview. Avoiding confrontation with Moscow is unlikely, and under these conditions, Europe has two main directions for action: continuing to aid Ukraine to prevent its defeat, and preparing its own armies and starting arms production. Obviously, this is about containing Russia itself (and if unlucky, also about military confrontation with it), not about a Russia-China alliance, which, militarily speaking, does not exist.

Meanwhile, one cannot shake the feeling that China to some extent still stands behind Russia, and this circumstance is all the more significant as Moscow’s dependence on Beijing takes on an increasingly vassal character. Will China push Russia to escalate relations with Europe or, on the contrary, restrain it from rash steps?

Relations between Beijing and Brussels cannot be called cloudless, and the level of mutual trust is not very high. There is a moderate tariff war (but not in Donald Trump’s style), European concerns about Chinese soft expansion, accusations of espionage, and the problem of alliance obligations with the US, which forces Europe, to some degree, to support Washington’s line of confrontation with China. At the same time, Beijing and Brussels have no serious contradictions, and economic ties are so extensive and diverse that they deserve careful treatment. From a rational point of view, China should be interested in preserving Europe as a part of the Western world that does not claim a global role but remains one of its economic centers. For Beijing, it would be preferable to deal not with one, represented by the US, but with two versions of the West. If these considerations are valid, Chairman Xi is unlikely to advise President Putin to attack Estonia and promise him his support—in fact, it can be assumed that the China factor will more likely contribute to containing the Russian threat to Europe rather than strengthening it.

The influence of the USA

All these considerations can be overturned by the actions of the main world power. It seems that in 2025, it is the US presidential administration that is working harder than anyone else to destroy the old world order. Meanwhile, the EU is one of the main targets of Washington’s criticism, and its reaction to the changing position of its old ally leaves much to be desired. Under Trump’s pressure, Europe looks somewhat confused, seeking the right tone and unable to fully trust the dubious American security guarantees.

It is precisely the ability of Europeans to pull themselves together, carry out military reforms, and start living without constantly looking to the US that guarantees their future. Otherwise, American tariffs and the Russian threat will work together to split and weaken Europe as if a cunning plan were being implemented.

Then even the Russia-China alliance, even such an unequal, contradictory, and amorphous one as it is now, will seem a terrible danger against which there is no defense. Then Beijing may also take an interest in discussing new aggressive intentions of Moscow, if they emerge.

But that is far off. In the current situation, all European efforts are focused on helping Ukraine, rearming themselves, and trying to build at least minimally predictable relations with Washington, primarily in areas where there is critical dependence on the US. Against this backdrop, the Russia-China rapprochement, in the form currently observable, should not cause concern.